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Why Envy Outperforms Admiration
Niels van de Ven1, Marcel Zeelenberg1, and Rik Pieters1
Abstract
Four studies tested the hypothesis that the emotion of benign envy, but not the emotions of admiration or malicious envy, 
motivates people to improve themselves. Studies 1 to 3 found that only benign envy was related to the motivation to study 
more (Study 1) and to actual performance on the Remote Associates Task (which measures intelligence and creativity; 
Studies 2 and 3). Study 4 found that an upward social comparison triggered benign envy and subsequent better performance 
only when people thought self-improvement was attainable. When participants thought self-improvement was hard, an 
upward social comparison led to more admiration and no motivation to do better. Implications of these findings for theories 
of social emotions such as envy, social comparisons, and for understanding the influence of role models are discussed.
Keywords
envy, admiration, social comparison, performance, motivation, role models
Received May 27, 2010; revision accepted December 22, 2010
Admiration is happy self-surrender; envy is unhappy self- 
assertion.
Søren Kierkegaard, 1849/2008
Although people generally consider it a virtue to admire and 
a vice to envy, Kierkegaard’s (1849/2008) assertion suggests 
a different viewpoint, namely, that envy is a more productive 
emotion than admiration is. Put differently, admiring some-
one feels positive but may not lead to a motivation to improve 
oneself (happy self-surrender), whereas being (benignly) 
envious of someone feels frustrating and as such may promote 
a motivation to improve oneself (unhappy self-assertion). 
This counterintuitive idea that the vice envy may be more 
productive than the virtue admiration was the guiding prin-
ciple  in  our  research.  Let  us  examine  why  admiration  is 
unlikely to stimulate performance, while (benign) envy is.
Admiration  is  a  feeling  of  delighted  approval  of  the 
accomplishment or character of another person and is argued 
to have inspiration as its motivational output (Algoe & Haidt, 
2009; Keltner & Haidt, 1999). Inspiration “involves the tran-
scendence of the ordinary preoccupations or limitations of 
human agency” (Thrash & Elliot, 2003, p. 871). In other 
words, admiration is likely to lead to feelings of connected-
ness to the other person, to openness, and to increased energy 
levels (Hart, 1998; Thrash & Elliot, 2004). Algoe and Haidt 
(2009) found that people who admired someone reported 
that they felt motivated to do better. Self-help websites also 
tout  the  motivating  power  of  admiration;  for  example, 
Gallozzi (2010) at www.personal-development.com states 
that admiration is a stepping stone that raises people to a 
higher level.
But is it really the case that admiration stimulates people 
to  do  better?  Although  some  research  seems  to  point  to 
inspirational effects of admiration (Algoe & Haidt, 2009; 
Lockwood & Kunda, 1997), no research has actually inves-
tigated whether admiration leads to improved performance. 
Put differently, research has indicated that people say they 
become inspired by the people they admire, but it has not 
looked at what people actually do when they feel admiration. 
Furthermore, there is reason to believe that positive feelings 
following upward comparisons, such as admiration, may not 
increase one’s motivation to perform and that inspiration and 
motivation cannot be equated. For example, the more posi-
tive people feel following an upward social comparison, the 
more  inspired  they  indicate  to  be  (Lockwood  &  Kunda, 
1997). Yet, the more negative participants feel about them-
selves following an upward comparison, the more they actu-
ally work harder and perform better (a “no pain, no gain” 
principle;  Johnson  &  Stapel,  2007a).  We  think  that  this 
apparent discrepancy exists because positive feelings that 
arise  from  an  upward  comparison  increase  more  passive 
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inspiration, whereas negative feelings increase active moti-
vation and performance. Therefore, we hypothesized that it 
is more likely that it is a negative emotion, such as envy, that 
leads to a motivation to do better following an upward social 
comparison.
Envy  is  the  emotion  that  “arises  when  a  person  lacks 
another’s superior quality, achievement, or possession and 
either desires it or wishes that the other lacked it” (Parrott & 
Smith, 1993, p. 906).1 Envy is thus accompanied by the goal 
to level the difference with the superior other. Interestingly, 
this can be accomplished by either moving oneself up or by 
pulling the other down. These latter, more destructive effects 
have been documented in the literature recurrently (Duffy & 
Shaw, 2000; Parks, Rumble, & Posey, 2002; Schaubroeck 
& Lam, 2004; Smith et al., 1996; Smith, Parrott, Ozer, & 
Moniz, 1994; Van Dijk, Ouwerkerk, Goslinga, Nieweg, & 
Galluci, 2006; Vecchio, 2000; Wert & Salovey, 2004). How-
ever, reviews of envy research have not documented any 
productive  effects  that  may  stem  from  envy  (Miceli  & 
Castelfranchi, 2007; Smith, 2008; Smith & Kim, 2007). Still, 
various scholars have pointed out that envy might spur a 
strong motivation to improve one’s own situation as well 
(Aristotle, 350BC/1954; Kant, 1780/1997; Neu, 1980; Parrott, 
1991; Rawls, 1971; Smith et al., 1994; Taylor, 1988). Aris-
totle, for example, claimed that ambitious men tend to be 
more envious than are others. Recent empirical work has 
confirmed that envy can contain the seeds of the motivation 
to improve (Cohen-Charash, 2009; Van de Ven, Zeelenberg, 
& Pieters, 2009).
Our work stems from a functional account of emotions 
that sees emotions as responses to problems or opportunities 
that arise in the environment (Frijda, 1986; Keltner & Gross, 
1999). An emotion is a response to a specific set of circum-
stances, and each emotion leads to specific motivations to 
deal with those circumstances (see also Fredrickson, 1998; 
Zeelenberg, Nelissen, Breugelmans, & Pieters, 2008). Envy 
arises when one’s social standing is threatened by another 
person who is better in a domain important to the self-view. 
Restoring one’s position after such a threat is important to 
people (Tesser, 1988), and envy and the motivations it acti-
vates helps to do so. Van de Ven et al. (2009) found support 
for  a  distinction  between  two  types  of  envy:  benign  and 
malicious envy. In their studies, participants recalled experi-
encing one of these types of envy and rated how the experi-
ence had felt to them and how they behaved and felt like 
behaving at that time. The most important difference was 
that participants who recalled being benignly envious indi-
cated having experienced action tendencies aimed at improv-
ing  themselves,  whereas  participants  who  recalled  being 
maliciously  envious  indicated  having  experienced  action 
tendencies aimed at degrading the other person. It is more 
likely that people experience benign envy if the advantage of 
the other is appraised as being deserved, whereas they are 
more likely to experience malicious envy if the advantage is 
appraised as being undeserved (see also Van de Ven, Zeelenberg, 
& Pieters, 2010a, 2010b, 2011).
The idea that benign envy motivates people to perform 
better when they are outperformed extends the “no pain, no 
gain” principle put forward by Johnson and Stapel (2007a). 
They argued that some frustration and self-threat (“pain”) is 
necessary for upward comparisons to stimulate performance 
(“gain). We have reason to believe, however, that pain by 
itself is not sufficient, as it is present in both benign and 
malicious envy. For malicious envy, we found earlier that 
there is emotional pain but no motivational gain for self-
improvement (Van de Ven et al., 2009). We therefore expect 
that it is the specific sting of benign envy that motivates peo-
ple to do better. We return to the relation between findings 
on affective reactions following upward comparisons and 
the literature on social comparisons more extensively in the 
General Discussion.
To summarize, we predicted that only benign envy, and 
not admiration or malicious envy, would motivate people to 
improve their performance. In an initial study we asked 
people  to  recall  an  upward  comparison,  after  which  we 
measured the experienced emotions and motivation. After 
this, we examined our hypothesis in two studies in which 
benign envy, malicious envy, and admiration were induced 
by recalling an episode of these emotional experiences 
or by completing an imagination task. A no-emotion con-
trol condition was included as a baseline measure of per-
formance.  In  the  final  study  we  investigated  the  self- 
surrendering nature of admiration in further detail, as we 
explain later.
Study 1
To examine whether experiencing benign envy does indeed 
lead to a motivation to improve oneself, we assessed stu-
dents’ planned effort to study in the upcoming semester after 
we had asked them to make an upward social comparison. 
Participants were asked to recall an instance in which some-
one else was better than they were. By recalling a certain 
situation in which emotions are felt, the action tendencies of 
these emotions are also activated again (Matelesta & Izard, 
1984; Strack, Schwarz, & Gschneidinger, 1985). Because it 
is only the emotion of benign envy following upward com-
parison that is thought to include action tendencies aimed at 
trying to do better, we expected only the intensity of benign 
envy in the recalled situation to be related to the motivation 
to improve oneself.
The current studies were run in the Netherlands. In the 
Dutch language (but also in other languages such as German, 
Polish, and Thai) there are separate words for benign envy 
(benijden) and malicious envy (afgunst). Online dictionaries 
(e.g., lookwayup.com) translate both Dutch words to envy in 
English, and envy translates to both afgunst and benijden. 
The existence of these two separate words for the envy types 
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facilitated  measuring  precisely  these  experiences,  as  we 
could directly ask for benign envy and malicious envy (see 
also Van de Ven et al., 2009).
Method
Seventeen undergraduate students were asked to describe a 
person they knew well who was better at something than 
they were. After this, they indicated how much they were 
benignly envious of this person, maliciously envious of this 
person, and admired this person (1 = not at all, 7 = very 
much so). The questions were presented in a random order 
for each participant. Next, in an ostensibly unrelated new 
study on work motivations, participants responded to the 
question, “Compared to last semester, how many hours more 
or less do you plan to spend on your study in the upcoming 
semester?”
Results and Discussion
Table 1 presents the data. Participants indicated that they 
felt admiration most, and more so than they felt benign and 
malicious envy. Most important to us was how variations in 
the experienced intensity of the three emotions related to the 
motivation to improve. As Table 1 shows, only benign envy 
was significantly related to the increase in hours the stu-
dents planned to spend on their studies. A regression analy-
sis with the three emotion measures added simultaneously 
as predictors of the motivation to study provides the same 
results; only benign envy, β = .54, p = .043, but not admira-
tion, β = -.10, p = .660, or malicious envy, β = .07, p = .781, 
predicted the intention to study more. This is a first indica-
tion that after being outperformed, benign envy increases 
the motivation to perform while admiration and malicious 
envy do not.
Table 1. Felt Emotions Following an Upward Comparison and 











2.47 (9.15) .58* .28 -.16





Note: Emotions toward better other measured on a 7-point scale, from 1 
(not at all) to 7 (very much so). 
*p = .015. All other correlations are not significant, p ≥ .140.
Study 2
Study 2 was designed to replicate Study 1 and extend the 
initial findings by moving from behavioral intentions to 
actual performance on a task that is sensitive to motiva-
tional input, the Remote Associates Task (RAT; McFarlin 
& Blascovich, 1984; Mednick, 1962). Performance on this 
task can increase when participants are more motivated, for 
example, when they concentrate more or spend more time 
on the task. We expected that participants who recalled an 
experience of benign envy would become more motivated 
to do well and to answer more items correctly as a result.
In Study 1 we measured the emotions experienced after an 
upward  social  comparison  was  made,  but  in  this  study  we 
experimentally induced them via an emotion recall task. Recall-
ing a situation in which a certain emotion was experienced 
reactivates the emotion and thereby also the motivational ten-
dencies associated with that emotion (Matelesta & Izard, 1984; 
Strack et al., 1985). If only benign envy contains the motivation 
to improve oneself, we expected that only participants who 
recalled being benignly envious would perform better on the 
RAT,  compared  to  those  who  recalled  admiring  someone, 
being maliciously envious, or those in a control group.
We also assessed the pleasantness of the recalled expe-
rience and the perceived deservedness of the advantage of 
the other in the recalled situation. We expected that admi-
ration felt more positive to the participants than benign and 
malicious envy did. Furthermore, we predicted that partici-
pants who were writing about an instance of benign envy 
would consider the recalled situation to be more deserved 
than those writing about an instance of malicious envy.
Method
Eighty-six participants2 were randomly assigned to a benign 
envy (n = 22), an admiration (n = 22), a malicious envy (n = 21), 
or a control condition (n = 21). After recalling an experience 
of benign envy, malicious envy, admiration, or nothing (the 
control condition) participants in the three emotion condi-
tions indicated how positive or negative the recalled emotion 
had felt (-3 = very negative to +3  = very positive) and how 
deserved they felt it was that the other person had an advan-
tage over them (-3 = very undeserved to +3 = very deserved). 
Next, an ostensibly unrelated study started, which was the 
RAT. The RAT consisted of 18 items, for which the partici-
pant is asked to think of a word that relates to three given 
words (e.g., for coffee, cake, butter, the word cup would be 
the  correct  answer).  It  was  introduced  as  “an  important 
instrument used to measure creativity and leadership.”
Results and Discussion
As shown in Table 2, the admiration experiences clearly felt 
more positive to the participants than did both types of envious 
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Study 3
A potential drawback of the recall procedure used in Study 2 
could be that the participants might not report only on dif-
ferent emotions but also on different social comparison others 
(e.g.,  professional  musicians  in  the  admiration  condition 
and fellow amateur musicians in the envy condition). Such 
possible  differences  in  comparison  others  might  have 
affected the results. Study 3 rules out this possibility by 
using one and the same situation for all participants and ask-
ing them to imagine and describe how they would feel and 
react if they would experience benign envy, admiration, or 
malicious envy in that situation. We again used the RAT as 
the measure of performance but now also recorded the time 
participants worked on the task. This allowed us to explore 
whether the superior performance in the benign envy condi-
tion was caused by a motivation to work longer on the task.
Method
Ninety-six students of Tilburg University took part in a series 
of  studies,  of  which  ours  was  part.  They  were  randomly 
assigned to a benign envy, admiration, malicious envy, or 
control condition (n = 24 per condition). The participants first 
read a story about a fellow student, “Hans de Groot” (adopted 
from Johnson & Stapel, 2007b). In the three emotion condi-
tions, a fake news article described Hans as an excellent stu-
dent from Tilburg University who had just won a prize in a 
prestigious student competition. Hans was selected for the 
competition because of his excellent grades and wide-ranging 
extracurricular activities, and had won because of his “remark-
able intellectual abilities shown during the completion of a 
variety of tasks.” The participants in the three emotion condi-
tions were asked to imagine that “Hans is a fellow student, 
and you feel strong benign envy/admiration/malicious envy 
toward  him.  Please  take  some  time  to  describe  how  you 
would feel, how you would react, what you would do if you 
would meet him, etc.” In the control condition, participants 
read about Hans as an average student who had participated 
in  the  student  competition  and  had  performed  reasonably 
well; in no way had he stood out (positively or negatively) 
during the tasks of the competition.
After participants had imagined and described how they 
would feel toward Hans, they responded to three manipula-
tion checks by indicating how much they would feel benign 
envy, admiration, and malicious envy toward Hans (1 = not 
at all to 9 = very much so).4 Next they were told they could 
work on the RAT “for a maximum of five minutes, or if you 
finish early or cannot find any new answers you can con-
tinue to the next study before the five minutes are over.”
Results and Discussion
Manipulation  checks. Table 3 presents the manipulation 
checks. There were differences between conditions on all 
Table 2. Pleasantness of the Emotional Experience and 







Benign envy -0.86a (1.73) 0.95b (1.91)
Admiration 1.82b (0.96) 2.36c (0.85)
Malicious 
  envy
-1.24a (1.26) -1.00a (1.18)
Statistics F(2, 62) = 32.98,
p < .001, ηp
2 = .52
F(2, 62) = 31.60,
p < .001, ηp
2 = .51
Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses. Subscripts indicate 
differences between conditions tested with least significant difference post 
hoc comparisons, with all ps < .001.
Figure 1. Motivational effects per emotion condition in Studies 2 
and 3
Note: Error bars represent ±1 SE of the mean. Post hoc analysis found 
that in each study, the benign envy condition differed from the other 
conditions; none of the other conditions differed significantly. RAT = 
Remote Associates Task.
experiences (which felt equally negative). Furthermore, the 
participants who recalled an instance of malicious envy had 
found it undeserved that another person had an advantage 
over them, whereas those who recalled an instance of benign 
envy or one of admiration had considered it to be deserved 
(for admiration more so than for benign envy).
The left panel of Figure 1 shows the average number of 
correct  answers  on  the  RAT  per  condition.  An  ANOVA 
revealed a significant effect of condition, F(3, 82) = 6.24, 
p = .001, ηp
2 = .19. As predicted, post hoc least significant 
difference  (LSD)  analysis  found  that  participants  in  the 
benign envy condition performed better (M = 11.38) than 
those in the admiration (M = 9.82, p = .024), malicious envy 
(M = 8.48, p < .001), and control (M = 9.33, p = .004) condi-
tions.  These  latter  three  conditions  did  not  differ  signifi-
cantly from each other (all ps ≥ .054).3
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three measures, and the manipulated emotion was always the 
dominantly experienced emotion in the corresponding con-
dition. Inspection of the results also shows that participants 
in the benign envy condition indicated feeling quite some 
admiration and malicious envy as well. Nevertheless, they 
did indicate (somewhat) more benign envy than admiration, 
paired t(23) = 1.81, p = .084, and malicious envy, paired 
t(23) = 2.73, p = .012.
Motivation and performance. As shown in the right panel 
of  Figure  1,  we  again  found  the  predicted  differences 
between conditions in performance on the RAT,5 F(3, 92) = 
3.52, p = .018, ηp
2 = .10. LSD post hoc analysis revealed that 
participants in the benign envy condition performed better 
(M = 10.21) on the RAT than those in the admiration (M = 
8.71, p = .012), malicious envy (M = 8.54, p = .005), and 
control (M = 8.75, p = .014) conditions. As before, these lat-
ter three conditions did not differ (all ps ≥ .772).
Figure 2 shows the time spent working on the RAT. Each 
step down in the lines from left to right indicates that a par-
ticipant voluntarily stopped working on the task at that time. 
The results of a survival analysis6 (Kaplan & Meier, 1958) 
confirmed our prediction that participants in the benign envy 
condition persisted on the task more than those in the admi-
ration, Breslow χ2(df = 1) = 6.28, p = .012, malicious envy, 
Breslow χ2(df = 1) = 3.59, p = .058, and control, Breslow 
χ2(df = 1) = 3.32, p = .068, conditions. These latter three 
conditions  did  not  differ  from  each  other,  all  Breslow 
χ2s(df = 1) ≤ 0.90, ps ≥ .343.
The time participants spent on the RAT (M = 238 s; 39 of 
the 96 participants used the full 5 min) was positively related 
to the number of correct answers on the RAT, β = .20, t(95) = 
1.98, p = .051. This shows that spending more time on the task 
had a positive effect on performance. Yet, even after control-
ling for the longer time spent working on the RAT, benignly 
envious participants still performed better than the participants 
in the other conditions, F(3, 96) = 2.74, p = .048, ηp
2 = .08, 
with all LSD post hoc tests having ps ≤ .046. This indicates 
that participants in the benign envy condition not only worked 
longer but also “smarter,” which is an intriguing finding.7
Table 3. Manipulation Checks of Study 3
Experienced emotions
Benign envy Admiration Malicious envy
Condition M (SD) M (SD) M (SD)
Control 3.75a (2.17) 4.63a (1.93) 2.63a (1.35)
Benign envy 6.25b (1.75) 5.33ab (1.69) 5.52b (1.98)
Admiration 4.92a (2.21) 6.04b (1.92) 3.54a (1.96)
Malicious envy 4.88a (2.23) 4.71a (2.14) 5.96b (2.26)
Statistics F(3, 92) = 5.69,
p = .001, ηp
2 = .16
F(3, 92) = 2.57,
p = .044, ηp
2 = .08
F(3, 92) = 15.34,
p < .001, ηp
2 = .33
Note: The experienced emotion is measured on a 9-point scale, from 1 (not at all) to 9 (very much so). Subscripts indicate differences between conditions 
tested with least significant difference post hoc comparisons, with all ps < .05.
Figure 2. Time spent on Remote Associates Task (RAT) per 
participant per condition in Study 3
Note: Steps from left to right in the curves indicate participants quitting 
the RAT.
This study also provides insights into a possible reason 
why  scholars  believe  that  admiration,  and  not  envy,  is  a 
motivating  factor.  For  example,  Parrot  (1991)  and  Smith 
(2004) reasoned that if envy “transmutes” or develops into 
admiration,  the  envious  will  become  motivated  to  attain 
more for themselves. In the present study, the participants 
who were benignly envious also indicated that they experi-
enced quite some admiration, perhaps because it is a more 
socially desirable answer (Parrott, 1991). However, a closer 
look at the effects of the self-reported emotions on perfor-
mance via regression analysis revealed that admiration was 
unrelated to performance, β = .08, t(95) = 0.79, p = .432, 
whereas benign envy was related to performance, β = .23, 
t(95) = 2.29, p = .024. Therefore, although the participants in 
the benign envy condition indicated experiencing quite some 
admiration, it was only their reported experience of benign 
 at Universiteit van Tilburg on June 6, 2011 psp.sagepub.com Downloaded from van de Ven et al.  789
envy that was associated with their performance, and this is 
crucial. This nicely replicates the findings of Study 1. Note 
that the intensity of the experienced malicious envy was also 
unrelated to performance, β = .12, t(95) = 1.15, p = .253, 
again showing that it is not just any pain following upward 
comparisons  that  stimulates  performance.  We  also  tested 
whether benign envy statistically mediated the effect that 
participants performed better in the benign envy condition 
compared to the malicious envy and admiration conditions 
via  the  bootstrapping  procedure  of  Preacher  and  Hayes 
(2008). Benign envy partially mediated the effect with a con-
fidence interval set at 90%.
Unhappy Self-Assertion 
Versus Happy Self-Surrender
So far we have found that benign envy increases the moti-
vation to do better, whereas malicious envy and admiration 
do not. The goal of the next study was to examine more 
closely the relation between benign envy and admiration. 
With  “happy  self-surrender,”  Kierkegaard  (1849/2008) 
suggested that admiration arises when people give in to the 
thought  that  they  will  not  be  able  to  attain  the  coveted 
object. In fact, he reasons (p. 71) that “an admirer who feels 
that he cannot be happy by surrendering himself elects to 
become  envious  of  that  which  he  admires.”  Whereas 
Kierkegaard describes it as a choice to become envious (if 
one cannot surrender), we believe it more likely that a per-
son in that situation remains envious. As we explain below, 
we have reason to believe that the initial reaction to an 
upward social comparison is envy. However, in situations 
where envy would be ineffective, some cognitive effort is 
taken to transform the experience into admiration. Let us 
explain why.
Envy is a counterfactual emotion that arises from feelings 
such as “it could have been me” (Elster, 1991; Teigen, 1997; 
Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2004). From a functional perspective, 
it is ineffective to be benignly envious of someone if the cov-
eted good cannot be obtained: An envious person would feel 
frustrated  but  would  not  be  able  to  fulfill  the  associated 
action  tendency  to  improve  one’s  situation.  Without  an 
opportunity  for  self-assertion,  only  discontent  with  one’s 
own situation would remain, which is clearly an undesirable 
state. We therefore predicted that when people believe that 
self-improvement is hard, they are more likely to experience 
admiration. Earlier research has indeed found that attainabil-
ity of the superior position of the upward comparison target 
matters for resulting self-perceptions (Lockwood & Kunda, 
1997, 1999), and Study 4 helps integrate our findings about 
social comparison emotions with that literature. Note that we 
do not intend to study whether the exact position of the supe-
rior target is attainable but rather whether people appraise 




Thirty-four participants were either primed with the idea that 
changing one’s behavior is easy (change is easy, n = 17) or 
that change is difficult (change is difficult, n = 17). The 
prime was that of Poon and Koehler (2006, Experiment 2), 
who used it to activate an incremental framework of person-
ality (traits can change over time) versus an entity frame-
work of personality (traits are as they are and do not change 
over time; see also Dweck, 1999). The prime was disguised 
as a “study of reading comprehension and explanation.” The 
prime in the change is difficult condition detailed the life and 
achievements of a (fictitious) great scientist on two pages, 
suggesting that he had always been on a path to becoming a 
scientist (the prototypical introverted student, born in a fam-
ily of eminent scientists, etc.). It suggested that to achieve 
something, everything should fall into place including things 
such as being born in the right family. In the change is easy 
condition, the many changes in the scientist’s life were high-
lighted (e.g., he was born in a poor family) to suggest he did 
many different things during his life, after which he still 
became a great scientist.
Next, participants read the newspaper article on Hans de 
Groot, the superior student who did well in the “national stu-
dent competition” (see Study 3). They were then asked to indi-
cate how much benign envy, malicious envy, or admiration 
they felt toward the superior student (1 = not at all, 7 = very 
much so). These questions were presented in a random order. 
After this, an ostensibly unrelated study started that mea-
sured their motivation to do better by assessing how much 
extra time they were planning to spend on studying in the 
upcoming semester (as in Study 1).
Results and Discussion
Table 4 presents the results. Participants in the change is 
easy condition felt more benign envy toward the superior 
student than did participants in the change is difficult condi-
tion. For admiration, the opposite pattern existed: Admira-
tion was (marginally) stronger when change was thought to 
be difficult than when it was thought to be easy. Malicious 
envy did not differ between conditions. We asked partici-
pants how many more or fewer hours they planned to spend 
on their study in the upcoming semester compared to the cur-
rent one, and we found that those in the change is easy condi-
tion planned to study more than did those in the change is 
difficult condition. Indeed, only in the change is easy condi-
tion did the participants plan to spend more hours on their 
study than they had in the previous semester, t(16) = 3.69, 
p = .002, d = 1.85, and this did not differ from zero in the 
change is difficult condition, t(16) = 0.17, p = .886, d = 0.09. 
Most importantly, if we added the emotions as covariates to 
the analysis on the effect of the primes on performance, the 
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effect of prime disappeared, F(1, 29) = 1.20, p = .283, 
ηp
2 = .04, and only benign envy was related to performance, 
F(1, 29) = 5.76, p = .023, ηp
2 = .17, while the other emotions 
were not, F(1, 29) ≤ 1.48, p ≥ .234, ηp
2 ≤ .05. Further analysis 
following the bootstrapping analysis of Preacher and Hayes 
(2008) confirmed that the effect of condition was indeed 
fully mediated by benign envy with a confidence interval set 
at 95%.
These results show that people who think that improve-
ment is under one’s own control experience more benign 
envy than admiration after being confronted with a superior 
other student. Being more benignly envious also led to a 
motivation  to  spend  more  time  on  studying.  However,  if 
improvement is thought to be outside of one’s control, peo-
ple feel more admiration and as a result do not become moti-
vated to study more.
General Discussion
A series of four studies supported Kierkegaard’s (1849/2008) 
original  hypothesis  that  envy  motivates  while  admiration 
equals  admitting  defeat.  Participants  experiencing  benign 
envy became motivated to work harder and actually per-
formed better than those experiencing admiration or mali-
cious envy. Study 1 showed that experiencing benign envy 
after  an  upward  comparison  led  to  an  intention  to  spend 
more  hours  studying  in  the  upcoming  semester,  whereas 
admiration and malicious envy did not. Study 2 revealed that 
participants performed better on the RAT (measuring intel-
ligence  and  creativity)  after  they  recalled  being  benignly 
envious than after they recalled admiring someone, being 
maliciously envious, or being in a neutral control condition. 
In Study 3, participants read a story about a superior student 
and were asked to imagine how they would respond if they 
were benignly envious to him, admired him, or were mali-
ciously envious toward him. As an indication of the higher 
motivation, participants who were benignly envious worked 
longer on the RAT than did others, which resulted in a better 
performance on this task.
Next, we investigated in Study 4 what happened if a per-
son was benignly envious but felt that self-improvement is 
difficult. If someone felt the frustrating experience of benign 
envy but could not resolve this because improvement was 
perceived to lie outside of one’s control, the emotion could 
not be resolved and the frustration would linger. We hypoth-
esized that when self-improvement is thought to be difficult, 
a situation that normally would trigger benign envy would 
then trigger admiration. Study 4 indeed found that when par-
ticipants  thought  improvement  was  under  one’s  control, 
benign envy was experienced and students planned to study 
more following an upward social comparison. When partici-
pants thought improvement was outside one’s control, admi-
ration was the stronger response and participants did not 
become motivated to do better.
Note that we do not argue that this is the only route to 
admiration, as this emotion may be experienced in many 
other circumstances. First, admiration often arises for virtu-
ous and moral acts (Algoe & Haidt, 2009; Immordino-Yang, 
McColl,  Damasio,  &  Damasio,  2009),  for  which  envy  is 
unlikely. Furthermore, a person who witnesses an outstand-
ing performance of another person in a domain that is not 
important for the person him- or herself (e.g., a scientist who 
sees a swimmer win an Olympic gold medal) is also likely to 
admire this person. An outstanding performance in a domain 
unimportant to oneself likely leads to admiration directly, a 
prediction that future research might test.
Although in our studies admiration did not improve per-
formance, we do not wish to claim that admiration lacks 
positive consequences overall. For example, the broaden-
and-build model (Fredrickson, 1998) describes how positive 
emotions broaden one’s repertoire for further actions. Posi-
tive  emotions,  such  as  admiration,  generally  signal  that 
things are going well, which can lead to creative exploratory 
behavior and strengthen the bonds between people. Also, 
more-recent research found that positive emotions such as 
pride can activate specific action tendencies as well (Harth, 
Kessler, & Leach, 2008; Williams & DeSteno, 2009). The 
functions of admiration thus remains unclear, but it could, 
Table 4. Emotions Experienced Toward Superior Student and Change in Study Hours per Condition in Study 4
Dependent variables
Benign envy Malicious envy Admiration
Change in study 
hours
Condition M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD)
Change is difficult  3.47 (1.51) 2.65 (1.41) 5.29 (1.11) +0.41 (9.93)
Change is easy 4.71 (1.49) 2.65 (1.37) 4.53 (1.33) +7.06 (9.46)
Statistics t(32) = 2.41,
p = .022, d = 0.85
t(32) = 0.00,
p = .999, d = 0.00
t(32) = 1.83,
p = .077, d = 0.65
t(32) = 2.16,
p = .038, d = 0.76
Note: Emotions were measured on 7-point scales, from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much so). Change in study hours was the number of hours participants 
indicated spending more or less on their study in the upcoming semester compared to the previous one.
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for  example,  inspire  novel  ways  to  reach  one’s  goals,  to 
focus on new domains of performance if one is severely out-
classed  in  one,  or  to  enhance  the  relationship  with  the 
admired person.
An interesting question is whether a benignly envious 
person becomes motivated to do better only in the domain 
where the envy existed or whether the motivation to do bet-
ter generalizes to other domains as well. For example, in our 
Study 1, participants recalled instances in which another per-
son outperformed them in an important domain. The recalled 
upward comparison was not always related to our study-
related measure of motivation to improve. The number of 
participants in that study is insufficient to conduct further 
analysis here, but we speculate that benign envy triggers a 
more general motivation to do better that is not limited to the 
domain of comparison. For example, we expect that if some-
one is benignly envious of a friend who excels at sports, this 
benign envy could lead to a motivation either to do better in 
sports or to spend more time studying. This likely depends 
on the circumstances, such as how important people find the 
domain of performance and whether an opportunity exists 
that allows for self-improvement. Further research is needed 
to clarify whether benign envy indeed leads to a general 
motivation to do better or to a more specific motivation only 
in the domain in which the envy was elicited.
The main difference in the appraisals that trigger benign 
or malicious envy is the perceived deservedness of the situa-
tion: If the advantage of another is deserved, benign envy is 
more likely; if it is undeserved, malicious envy is more likely 
(Van de Ven et al., 2010c). At first glance, this seems to 
relate to our finding that benign envy exists only if the situa-
tion is thought to allow for improvement. After all, unde-
served advantages of others imply that working hard might 
not  be  sufficient  to  achieve  the  desired  goals.  However, 
research on the appraisals of envy found that both perceived 
deservingness and perceived control over the situation have 
an independent effect on the type of envy that situations 
elicit. Furthermore, situations that trigger admiration are also 
strongly related to appraisals of deservingness: We admire 
people who deserve their good fortune, not those who were 
lucky. Deservingness of an advantage of another person by 
itself is therefore not sufficient to activate a motivation to 
improve oneself; it really is benign envy that does this. Con-
sistent  with  emotion  theory  (e.g.,  Frijda,  1986),  it  is  the 
appraisals of the situation that lead to the specific emotions, 
and these emotions in turn activate motivations.
Social Comparisons
The current results help illuminate how social comparisons 
affect behavior. Upward social comparisons have been found 
to influence people in various ways and can make people 
feel both worse and better about themselves (Collins, 1996). 
For example, some art students who enrolled in a 6-week 
summer  school  with  other  highly  skilled  students  felt 
threatened and inferior, whereas other students felt inspired 
in this situation (Burleson, Leach, & Harrington, 2005). 
The effects of upward comparisons on subsequent behavior 
are also mixed: They can stimulate people to do better 
(Blanton,  Buunk,  Gibbons,  &  Kuyper,  1999;  Marx  & 
Roman, 2002; Seta, 1982) but can also hurt subsequent per-
formance (Dijksterhuis et al., 1998; Stapel & Suls, 2004). 
Johnson and Stapel (2007a) combined these earlier findings 
and found that only when people felt threatened after an 
upward comparison did their performance became better. 
Our findings are consistent with this “no pain, no gain” 
principle but go beyond it by revealing that it is not just any 
pain from upward comparisons that increases performance. 
Malicious envy also included negative feelings about one-
self (see, e.g., Study 2; Van de Ven et al, 2009) but did not 
increase performance. A negative feeling is not sufficient 
for an upward comparison to motivate. It appears that the 
specific sting of benign envy, not just any sting, is the impe-
tus to improving one’s own position after an upward social 
comparison.
An important aspect of the current findings is that if achieve-
ments were thought to be difficult to attain, performance 
did not increase after an upward comparison. Lockwood 
and Kunda (1997) studied related phenomena and found 
that  1st-year  students  rated  themselves  better  on  attri-
butes such as being bright and skillful when they were con-
fronted with a superior 4th-year student, whereas 4th-year 
students who were confronted with this outstanding other 
rated  themselves  as  worse.  These  findings  are  generally 
interpreted as showing that attainability of the accomplish-
ment matters; if the superior position is thought to be attain-
able, people become inspired. However, as discussed before, 
inspiration and actual performance seem to be different con-
structs;  admiration  contains  inspiration  (Algoe  &  Haidt, 
2009), but the current studies found that admiration does not 
(directly) stimulate performance. The findings of Lockwood 
and Kunda are important, but these authors did not investi-
gate how these experiences influenced subsequent perfor-
mance. Based on their research and the current findings, we 
predict that only the 4th-year students would perform better 
on a subsequent task. After all, a self-threat is necessary for 
performance  to  increase  (Johnson  &  Stapel,  2007a),  and 
being more similar to the superior target makes it more likely 
that (benign) envy is experienced (Salovey & Rodin, 1984; 
Schaubroeck & Lam, 2004). Although these predictions dif-
fer from those of Lockwood and Kunda, note that their gen-
eral idea is related to ours: When confronted with an upward 
comparison,  perceptions  that  improvement  is  difficult  to 
attain do not spur a motivation to perform. The key differ-
ence is our idea that it is not the attainability of the position 
of  the  outstanding  other  that  determines  motivation  but 
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rather whether the person who compares upward perceives 
the subsequent situation to allow for self-improvement. Per-
ceived control potential therefore remains an important mod-
erator  explaining  when  (and  why)  upward  comparisons 
stimulate performance.
Linking the current work to that on social comparisons 
also helps make predictions on how people can cope with 
being  benignly  envious.  As  we  have  shown,  the  typical 
action tendency of benign envy is to try harder, which helps 
to relieve oneself from the frustrating experience of envy. 
Johnson and Stapel (2007a) found that affirming oneself (by 
recalling some positive aspects of oneself) removed the self-
threat after an upward comparison. Lockwood and Kunda 
(1999) found that upward comparison did not affect partici-
pants when they had previously imagined their own best per-
formance. Recalling one’s own positive aspects is thus likely 
to help to alleviate (or prevent) feelings of envy after being 
confronted with a superior target. As Johnson and Stapel 
also found, this comes at the cost of losing the extra motiva-
tion to perform better.
The findings in the current article are also consistent with 
work on counterfactuals in the social domain. People can 
sometimes choose with whom to compare: people who are 
worse off or people who are better off. In situations that 
allow for improvement, people tend to compare to those who 
are better off, whereas in situations that do not allow for 
better  performance,  they  prefer  downward  comparisons 
(Markman, Gavanski, Sherman, & McMullen, 1993; Roese 
& Olson, 1995). This clearly reflects our ideas that benign 
envy entails self-assertion and admiration entails self-surrender. 
The counterfactual literature also proposes that it is negative 
affect  that  causes  an  increased  motivation  after  making 
upward  counterfactual  comparisons  (Epstude  &  Roese, 
2008; Markman & McMullen, 2003; Markman, McMullen, 
& Elizaga, 2008). Our data reveal instead that it is not just 
any pain that activates the motivation to do better, as benign 
and malicious envy were affectively equally negative, but 
malicious  envy  did  not  improve  performance  and  benign 
envy did.
Role Models
The current findings may also shed new light on how role 
models can influence people. Because benign envy increases 
performance and admiration does not, we would predict that 
role models that trigger benign envy have a greater impact 
on performance than those that elicit admiration. Consistent 
with this idea is the finding that role models increase perfor-
mance  more  for  people  who  are  more  likely  to  compare 
themselves with others (Buunk, Peiro, & Griffioen, 2007). 
This dispositional tendency to compare oneself with others, 
the social comparison orientation (Gibbons & Buunk, 1999), is 
positively related to the dispositional tendency to experience 
envy (Smith, Parrott, Diener, Hoyle, & Kim, 1999; see 
Zeelenberg  &  Pieters,  2007).  Based  on  these  findings,  it 
seems safe to conclude that those who tend to compare them-
selves to others and thus experience envy regularly are more 
likely to become motivated after being exposed to an out-
standing, but attainable, role model.
Another example where envy might help in making pre-
dictions is found in research on the effect that female role 
models  have  on  other  females’  math  test  performance 
(Marx & Roman, 2002). Females tend to perform worse 
than males on a math test when a male experimenter is pres-
ent (a result from stereotype threat; see Steele, 1997). How-
ever, when a female experimenter was present who was 
highly  competent  in  math,  performance  of  the  females 
increased. Marx and Roman (2002) attribute this effect to a 
“buffering  effect”  of  the  role  model,  but  an  alternative 
explanation might be that the females are benignly envious 
of the superior other. As discussed before, superior similar 
people in important domains elicit most envy. The female 
participants in this study were selected for their interest in 
math, and for these females a high-achieving role model is 
likely to elicit benign envy, which could have caused the 
better performance for them.8 If benign envy played a role 
in  causing  the  results  in  this  study,  a  similar  pattern  is 
expected for the male participants; the males are expected 
to be more benignly envious when a well-performing male 
was present than when a well-performing female was pres-
ent. The data suggest that this might have been the case, 
and although the difference was not significant, this could 
be caused by the small number of participants, as a medium-
sized  effect  existed.  Investigating  whether  role  models 
indeed elicit benign envy might help illuminate how out-
standing others motivate persons.
Conclusion
Across four studies we find that benign envy, but not other 
emotions associated with upward social comparisons, stimu-
lates better performance following an upward comparison. 
Admiration feels good but does not lead to a motivation to 
improve oneself. Kierkegaard (1849/2008) called admiration 
happy self-surrender, a feeling that the other is so good at 
something that one can only look with appreciation at how 
good the other is. Benign envy, on the other hand, feels frus-
trating but it does lead to a motivation to improve. Kierkeg-
aard called this unhappy self-assertion, a negative feeling 
about oneself that arises from a comparison to the outstand-
ing other but that does elevate effort and performance. Is 
benign envy therefore better than admiration? It might be, but 
although self-assertion increases performance, self-surrender 
feels better. So, the answer to the question whether to admire 
or to be envious might depend on what matters most: feeling 
better or performing better.
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Notes
1.  Note that envy is often referred to with the word jealousy, but 
clear differences exist. Whereas envy arises when another per-
son has something that one lacks, jealousy arises when a person 
has something but is afraid of losing it to another person (Neu, 
1980; Parrott & Smith, 1993; Smith, Kim, & Parrott, 1988).
2.  One participant who indicated having never experienced mali-
cious envy was dropped from the analysis.
3.  Participants in the admiration condition performed marginally 
better than those in the malicious envy condition, p = .054.
Because this effect was not found in Study 3, we do not con-
sider this to be a meaningful difference.
4.  The order was counterbalanced, which had no influence on the 
results whatsoever, F(15, 243) = 0.72, p = .730, ηp
2 = .04.
5.  Performance on the Remote Associates Task (RAT) in Study 3 
was slightly worse than in Study 2, probably because we added 
the maximum duration of 5 min in Study 3.
6.  An  ANOVA  with  the  emotion  condition  as  the  between- 
subjects variable and the time spent working on the RAT as the 
dependent variable showed the same pattern, F(3, 92) = 2.59, 
p = .058, ηp
2 = .08. The average time participants worked on the 
task per condition was 269 s in the benign envy condition, 213 s 
in the admiration condition, 237 s in the malicious envy condi-
tion, and 235 s in the control condition. However, because the 
data are not normally distributed due to the maximum duration 
of 5 min, a survival analysis is the preferred method of analysis 
(Mantel, 1966).
7.  Interestingly, Harkins (2006) found that the RAT—as a mea-
sure of motivation and performance—may sometimes be less 
straightforward than it seems: He found that for some types of 
difficult items, an increased motivation might actually lead to 
lower performance. The RAT we used contained nine easy and 
nine difficult items, and in both Studies 2 and 3 we found that 
the increased performance on the RAT was caused by better 
performance on the difficult items; on the easy items, no dif-
ferences existed between conditions. Given our pattern of find-
ings, including the measure of time spent on the task in Study 3 
shows that for our RAT measure, a higher motivation does lead 
to higher performance.
8.  This does not explain why a stereotype threat occurs, only that 
the “buffering effect” is potentially caused by benign envy.
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